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ABSTRACT

There is $2.3 Billion riding on the answer to a very ..
critical question in the Virginia Telephone Industry.

The

question concerns who should pay for the embedded investment in
jointly used wire and equipment con~ecting telephone custom~rs t~
switching off ices.

This plant, many argue, is needed for

1

ac~ess·

to the local and long distance network regardless of whether;a
call is made.
Answering this question is a two step process.

First these,'
''-'

~

costs must be allocated to the proper jurisdiction (intrastate
or.
'
'
'

interstate) and the proper class of service (toll or local)
within the jurisdiction.

Second the costs must be recovered from

customers (local customers, long distance customers, and

;',,'·.',

l

interexchange carriers).

In the days before long distance_

competition, a large portion of these costs were allocated t<;>:;,and ·.
recovered from toll so local rates were kept affordable.
Competitive pressures and changes in the industry
this practice to cease.

are:forc~ng

There is no consenus'and a

~ar~e ~~~ree

of controversy over the new allocation and recovery ~ro6es~."
'
'

In Virginia, existing recovery is based

on'inte~im~
·''','

guidelines.

A more permanent policy and direction is .. needed on
,'

recovering these jointly used faci 1 i ties.

~

. ,•

'·

This Jresearch·: was

designed to aid in developing poi lcy and direct'ion.

Maior

findings include:
o

All customers who use a service (including long distatice
companies who get local exchange ac6ess) should'pay f6r
the joint facilities used in furnistiing that service.
v

o

The two most logical allocation and recovery
methodologies are
usage based and
stand alone

o

Optimum allocation and recovery should be determined by
competitive market conditions within a range bounded by
stand alone at one end and usage at the other. The
competition in this case is bypass.··
··.,
,'

o

A more appropriate and more narrow range would be

\,'

.. ·,

bounded by existing recovery at one extreme and usage
based recovery with a 25% interstate (stand alone) .. ,_
allocation at the other. This is a usage-stand alori~
hybrid that combines advantages of both approaches~- ·
o

Moving from present recovery to the usage-stand al6ne ..
hybrid would (based on nationwide data) shift about'
$4.70 in revenue requirements per line per month to end
users. Of the $4.70, approximately $2.10 would be a
federal Subscriber Line Charge increase. Local rates :
would only have to absorb about $2.60. Recovery from
long distance companies would decrease nearly 60% ($6.S
Billion). The carrier common line charge would fall
from 4.33 cents per minute to roughly 1.9 cents. ,1

o

Recovery from long distance companies should promote
usage (preferably in off peak periods). This would be
in the form of a flat rate "rent,• or a usage based
recovery with volume or tapered discounts.· The present
uniform usage recovery (carr~er common line~.charge) has
no incentive to stimulate usage.
~~~~

vi

INTRODUCTION
The Problem
Was the telephone network built to carry l.ocal calls or hong.
'

·,'

distance calls?

This fundamental question has

,«•

remained~
'

'•/.

unanswered for decades. Today, local calling prices are.going up;
and long distance rates are declining.
do with that answer.

ha~ ~o~

Part of .the reason
·_i,,'

A war is raging over that 'issue between·
the.
._,
;,

"

'..'.

telephone industry, federal regulators, and state
,

Federal regulators have their answer.

The long

'

')

r

··r

'\

regulators~

'.:'1 ',·'\(,'

'

•' ;«

d~stance,

telephone companies have theirs, and the local.. companies.have,
'.
. '
. .,
>~

theirs.

State regulators are caught in the middle. :, Iri thfs
'

paper, I will examine that question, and answer

~it

,'.·

fr~m~the

perspective of a Virginia regulator.
There is a huge investment in telephone plant and equipment·
'

't

'

'

't

~

'

that goes from the telephone company's switching ~ffice· to each
customer's premise.

It is commonly called the•local foop, and'

was installed at the local telephone c6mpanies' expense.
Virginia, it exceeds $2.3 Billion.

Many argue it is

In

ne~d~d

regardless of whether a call is made, and thus.is considered;non-.
traffic sensitive (NTS) or fixed plant.

This same plant is. u'~ed
'\. '";'

.

.

'

'

to make a local call or a long distance call • .' Also, the same
line is used to make calls between states (int~~s~ate) or calls
within a state (intrastate).
Traditionally, the Federal

Communications~Commission

(FCC)

set rates for interstate toll calls, and state commissions set
rates for intrastate toll as well as local calls.

At

i~sue·~~~

how much· of the cost of the loca 1 loop should be charged to
interstate long distance, how much to intrastate long distance,
and how much to local.
Historically, less than 10 percent of all calls (local and:
toll) were interstate, but nearly 30 percent of the costs were.
allocated there.

Substantial portions of the costs were also

allocated to intrastate toll.

This meant local loop costs for.

local calling could be kept down.

In effect, a profit.
afford~ble.

contribution from toll went to keep local service

Thus, the price of a long distance or a local call bore.no
relation to the actual cost of providing it.
Overpricing toll to subsidize local worked fine in.the

.1

monopoly days when the telephone industry was a partnership
~:.

;

the Bell System and the 1500 or so independent companies.
partnership crumbled when competition was allowed in

That
long

t~e

distance market, and when the Bell System was broken up.
competition, the concept of sharing revenues

need for rates based on economic costs has moved
forefront.

.a,nd the

vanish~d,

·

to~the

•>'>

In addition, technology has advanced to 0 th~~~~int.

that it is becoming increasingly affordable to build priv~~e ··
~

'

. t

networks which bypass portions, if not all, of _the: public
network.
The result of al 1 this leaves state regulators .:in a di lemma.
,,

.'

'

I,

The problem is determining how to pay for the fixed costs.of
jointly used local networks while toll competition~gro~s ~~d.
there is already upward pressure on local rates.

The traditional

method of cost and revenue allocations is being overhauled.
distance companies are now paying local companies for the
?

Long

privilege of accessing the local network (or for the customers'
privilege of accessing the long distance network, depending from
whose perspective one looks.)

These payments are called access

charges, and a portion is currently targeted to pay for fixed
local loop costs.
solution.

This, according to the FCC, is a temporary

The problem remains:

who should pay for these ~f,ixed

costs?
Objectives
First we must decide how much of the local loop costs· should;
be allocated to the joint services that use it.

Second we must

determine how much the long distance companies should pay the
local companies for having access to that network.

Third,'we
. \>',.
must decide how much customers should pay towards recovering that'
'

fixed network.

And finally, we should define how the

;

i

,rec.o~ery.

should be structured.
The objective of this investigation is to answer :,tnese , •·
.

,l.,.

1·,,:.,·,,

questions and propose a NTS local loop recovery plan which is:
1.

Simple and easy to administer.

2.

Easy for customers to understand.

3.

Fair to customers, local telephone companies', 'andrlong'
distance companies.

4.

A deterrent to uneconomic bypass.
Significance

The Virginia State Corporation Commission began
investigating access charges in 1983.
overhaul at the Federal level.

That coincided .., with the•

Companies in Virginia have been

operating under interim guidelines since then.

The Commission

permitted them to file their own tariffs to recover NTS costs.
These filings, for the most part, mirrored FCC tariffs.
The significance of this research is to develop a specific
strategy and plan for the Commission to consider for recovering
NTS costs in Virginia.

If adopted, interim guidelines may be

replaced with more permanent Virginia specific procedures for
allocating and recovering local loop costs.

4

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

General
The history of this problem may be divided into two broad
time periods:

(1) before divestiture and (2) after divestiture.

Divestiture, of course, was the unprecedented breakup of the Bell
System on January 1, 1984 as part of the Consent Decree (Modified
Final Judgment) between the Justice Department and American
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T).

Under the settlement,

AT&T agreed to give up ownership of its local telephone
companies.

It kept, among other things, its long distance

business, its research arm (formerly known as Bell Labs), and its
equipment manufacturing arm (known then as Western Electric).
From this breakup came the concept of access char_ges.

Prior to

this, sharing toll revenues was done through a process known as
separations, settlements, and division of revenues.

The

divestiture is significant because it was the end of the precompetition era of revenue sharing (settlements and division of
revenues), and the beginning of the post-competition era (access
charges).

Although toll competition was allowed years earlier,

the cost allocation and revenue sharing procedures had not been
revised to reflect it.
The telephone industry had evolved as a partnership of one
national long distance company (AT&T Long Lines), 22 local Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs) owned by AT&T, and several thousand
independent local companies (independent in the sense they were
not part of the Bell System).

Most interstate long distance

(toll) service was provided by AT&T Long Lines.

Local service

and most intrastate toll was furnished by the local companies.
5

For many calls, equipment owned by all of these was used, and a
method to compensate each was needed.

Since much of the plant

could be used jointly for local and long distance, a cost
allocation method was necessary to determine how much of the
joint plant should be allocated to interstate toll, intrastate
toll, and local.
separations.

This cost allocation process was called

Once the allocation was done, a method was needed

to divide the toll revenues.

This cost recovery process was

called settlements and division of revenues.

Settlements was the

process of sharing revenues with the independent companies, and
division of revenues was AT&T's reimbursement to the BOCs.

All

interstate toll revenues were pooled with AT&T and later
apportioned to the independents and BOCs based on their relative
costs determined through separations studies.

The BOCs acted as

the clearing house for intrastate toll.
Underlying Factors
In the pre-divestiture days, there were two underlying
factors that shaped separations and settlements policy.

First

was the controversy over two philosophically opposite separations
approaches:

(1) the Board-to-Board Theory and (2) the Station-

to-Station Theory.

Second was the phenomenon known as toll rate

disparity.
The Board-to-Board principle came first.

In calculating

toll costs, it considered only the equipment investment between
and including the originating and terminating toll switchboards.
All local exchange plant, including the local switchboard and
local loop, was excluded.

The practical effect of this was toll

assumed none of costs of the jointly used exchange plant.

All

was assigned to local and recovered through local rates.
The Station-to-Station theory evolved later, and included
the plant from the originating station (telephone set) to the
terminating station in calculating toll costs.

Thus, a portion

of the jointly used exchange plant was assigned to toll, and
exchange rates were relieved of this burden.

I will discuss in

more detail later how these two philosophies evolved in the
separations process.
The second underlying shaper of separations and settlements
was the toll rate disparity problem.

Simply put, this is the

difference in intrastate and interstate toll rates. It had
several causes.

Primarily, it resulted from the dual regulatory

process in the United States where the FCC regulated interstate
toll and the state public utility commissions regulated
intrastate toll.

Since the board-to-board method assigned all

local exchange costs to the state jurisdiction, interstate toll
was allocated none of these costs.
proportionally less expensive.

This made interstate toll

In addition, advances in

technology saw unit costs fall for long haul toll, whereas costs
for short haul toll and local service stayed about the same.
Most long haul toll is interstate and shorthaul toll is
intrastate.

Therefore, these economies enabaled interstate toll

rates to be reduced over the years to the point that intrastate
rates for calls of similar distances were significantly higher.
Separations changes over the years reduced this disparity.

1910 - 1930 Period
The history of separations has roots to the early 1900's.
'

In a 1913 Minnesota Rate Case (Simpson, et al. v. Sheppard, 230
US 352), the

u.s.

Supreme Court examined railroad property

investment that had been allocated based on revenues.

It found:

"It would seem necessary to find a basis for total value of the
property independently of revenue and this must be found in the
use made of the property."(!)

Thus, it said usage instead of

revenue should be used to allocate property.

The second

applicable court decision was even more significant.
specifically to telephone cost allocations.

It applied

In 1930, the Supreme

Court in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, (282

u.s.

133)

held:
••• While the difficulty in making an exact
apportionment of the property is apparent, and extreme
nicety is not required, only reasonable measures being
essential ••• it is quite another matter to ignore
altogether the actual uses to which the property is
put. It is obvious that, unless an apportionment is
made, the intrastate service to which the exchange
property is allocated will bear an undue burden •••• (2)
In effect, the Court adopted the station-to-station basis of
separation.

However, AT&T did not rush to implement the Court's

decision:
The station-to-station theory of ratemaking was not
accepted fully by the Bell System until 1943 with
respect to interstate toll services, and in its
intrastate toll services not u~jil 1950, when the
company amended those tariffs. )
At any rate, the period of 1910 through 1930 saw little interest
in separations outside of these two court decisions.

The state

regulatory commissions as well as the Interstate Commerce
Commission (which had interstate communications regulatory

responsibility at the time) paid little, if any, attention to
separations matters.
1930 - 1945 Period
The creation of the FCC in 1934 changed that however.

Since

AT&T profits were excessive, the FCC initiated a long series of
AT&T voluntary interstate rate reductions.

For example, between

1935 and 1940 several rate reductions took place which
cumulatively totaled $95 million.

In 1941, over objections of

state regulators, another $14 million reduction occured.

A $50

million reduction came in 1943, $8 million in 1944, and $21 and
$16 million in 1945.< 4>

These reductions were not duplicated at

the state level, and the toll rate disparity problem began
growing into a serious issue.
In 1941, the first formal investigation of separations was
initiated by the FCC (Docket 6328).

This came after urging by

the Bell System and the National Association of Railroad and
Utility Commissioners (NARUC; now called the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners).

Incidentally, and

ironically, and this docket remained open for 25 years without a
decision.

The primary issue was the board-to-board versus

station-to-station allocation principle.
A major breakthrough came in 1943 when the Bell System filed
interstate tariffs using on the station-to-station principle:
This reversal, following the adamant stand taken [by
AT&T] the previous year, appears to be evidence of
recognition by the Bell System of the two-fold
character of separations and methods: the formal
character, as precription for allocating property,
revenues, and expenses to the jurisdiction; the
political ~haracter governing the direction of costs
and rates.{S)
9

Post War Era
Separations in the post-war era was influenced primarily
through politically charged negotiation and compromise between
the FCC, NARUC, and the Bell System.
highlights.

There were several

First, the concept of proportionate usage (state

verus interstate) was accepted as an appropriate allocation
methodology.

Second, the first Separations Manual was developed

in 1947 as a joint effort of NARUC and the FCC.

Third there was

increasing pressure on state regulators to increase local rates,
and the toll rate disparity problem grew.

Hence, the states

looked more and more to the interstate jurisdiction as a haven to
shift costs.

A series of changes (highlighted in Table l)

transferred increasingly more costs to interstate.
Table 1
Separations Changes:

Year
1947
1952
1956
1962
1965

1969
1971

1947 - 1911< 6 >
Increased Allocation to
Interstate (as % of Total
Revenues)

Change
Simplification in Methods
Charleston Plan
Modified Phoenix Plan
Simplification in Methods
Denver Plan
FCC Plan
Ozark Plan

2.9%
3.7%
3.2%
2.3%
4.6%
2.2%
2.2%

Unfortunately, states were not able to (or elected not to}
take advantage of these shifts, and very few lowered toll rates.
AT&T found itself in the anomalous position being able to absorb
the increased costs while continuing interstate rate reductions.
The demand elasticity for toll calling stimulated usage, and the

10

rate reductions were offset by increased volumes so total
revenues actually increased.

This continued into the 1960's and

early 1970's when an entirely new force emerged. That was
competition.
Competition
Suddenly, through a series of court and FCC decisions, AT&T
found it had competitors such as MCI and Sprint in the long
distance market.

In addition, the local companies, both Bell and

independent, found they had long distance companies other than
AT&T asking for access to their networks to reach potential toll
customers.

In effect, the long time partnership ceased to exist

because these new competitors were not part of, and by nature
could not be a part of the traditional pooling process.

These

companies, called OCCs or Other (than AT&T) Common Carriers,
argued they should not be required to pay the same as AT&T for
access to local companies since their connections were inferior
to AT&T's.

(AT&T customers could make a call by dialing, at

most, 11 digits while OCC customers had to dial up to 23 digits.)
The OCCs said they should only pay the going business line rate,
since that was the facility they used to access the local
network.

Thus, this nightmare was superimposed on the already

controversial question of state versus interstate cost
allocations.
The FCC made a somewhat futile attempt to resolve it by
approving ENFIA tariffs (Exchange Network Facility for Interstate
Access).

These gave the OCCs access to local networks at rates

that were roughly 35% of AT&T's.

ENFIA tariffs and ensuing

negotiations were extremely controversial.
11

Divestiture
Fortunately, (or unfortunately to some), the divestiture
preempted ENFIA by ordering BOCs to •offer to all interexchange
carriers exchange access on an unbundled, tariffed basis, that is
equal in type and quality to that provided for ••• AT&T •••• •< 7 >
Further, the court ordered the BOCs to file tariffs for exchange
access to all carriers, and said these tariffs would take the
place of the division of revenues process.
From the MFJ came three fundamental concepts that are
paramount to today's industry structure.

First, all BOCs were

ordered to provide •equal access,• and they are now modifying
their switching offices to do this.

Second, geographic

boundaries were drawn· to define the difference between exchange
communications and interexchange communications.

These somewhat

arbitrary boundaries are called LATAs (Local Access and Transport
Areas).

BOCs may provide service only within a LATA, and are

prohibited from providing service between them.

The rxcs

(interexchange carriers which include OCCs plus AT&T) primarily
offer service between LATAs, but are not prohibited by the MFJ
from serving within them.

This is under state jurisdiction, and

many states (Virginia included) do not yet permit intraLATA
competition.

Third, the BOCs were ordered to file exchange

access tariffs.
Following the MFJ, the FCC developed an access charge plan
which applied to all local exchange companies (LECs) and all
interexchange companies.

This plan, which will be discussed in

the next section, was only for interstate access, and the states

12

were free· to develop their own plans.

State plans were needed

both for intrastate, interLATA access, and for intrastate,
intraLATA access.
The FCC Access Charge Plan
The FCC isstied its original access charge plan on February
28, 1983 in its Third Report and Order in Docket 78-72.
Interestingly, it did not

att~mpt

to change existing cost

allocation or separation procedures.

These are outlined in Part

67 of the FCC's Rules and Regulations.
the NARUC-FCC Separations Manual.

Part 67 was adopted from

In concurrent proceedings, the

FCC addressed the separations issue by:

(1) freezing the

Subscriber Plant Factor (interstate allocation percentage) as of
December 31, 1983 at an average of approximately 28%, and (2)
replacing the frozen SPF by a uniform 25% gross assignment factor
that is to be phased in over eight years starting in 1986.

Thus,

ultimately 25% of fixed local exchange costs will be allocated to
the interstate jurisdiction.
The FCC's plan deals specifically with cost recovery
(formerly known as settlements and division of revenues) instead
of cost allocations.
Regulations.

It is detailed in Part 69 of its Rules and

The plan has eleven specific charges or elements

that are designed to compensate local exchange companies for
providing access to interexchange companies.
We are concerned only with the ones that recover the nontraffic sensitive loop costs.

There are two, and they are called

the carrier common line charge (CCLC) and the subscriber line
charge (SLC; originally known as the customer access line charge
or CALC).

The basic premise and ultimate goal of the FCC's NTS
13

cost recovery plan is that most of these costs should no longer
be recovered from long distance revenues.

Instead, they should

be recovered through monthly flat rates charged by local
companies to all customers.

In effect, the

FC~

side-stepped the

sensitive cost allocation issue by allowing 25% of these costs to
continue being allocated to interstate.

However, by assigning

all of the cost recovery to local instead of long distance
customers, it has deviously accomplished the same result that
would have occurred had it not

assigned~

of these costs to the

interstate jurisdiction.
As a transition, the FCC is gradually shifting the cost
recovery to local customers.
element.

The vehicle is the SLC access

The interexchange carriers are temporarily paying the

rest in usage based (per minute of use) payments to the
companies.

lo~al

This is the CCLC element. In theory, under the FCC's

plan, as the CCLC goes down over time, the SLC will increase
until ultimately the CCLC will approach zero and all loop costs
will be recovered through SLCs.

(The ultimate CCLC will be a

nominal amount to pay for a Universal Service Fund which is a
subsidy to high cost companies.)
Another important feature of the FCC's plan is the pooling
arrangement for the CCLC.

Participation is mandatory.

Theoretically, all interstate CCLC payments made by long
distance companies go into a pool.

The local companies merely

act as a conduit to channel the funds into the pool.

(In

reality, only the cash flow of revenues netted against costs goes
into the pool.)

The pool is administered by the National
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Exchange Carrier Association (NECA), and funds are apportioned to
each company according to its costs.
is uniform nationwide.

The CCLC rate filed by NECA

A primary goal of the pool is to keep

toll rates from being geographically deaveraged.
According to the FCC, an ideal access charge plan would:
(1)

Promote Efficiency: The FCC argued that it is
economically inefficient to charge customers based on
usage for plant costs that do not vary with the amount
of usage. It said the marginal cost of using the local
loop was zero. Therefore, the price charged to
interexchange carriers should also be zero.

(2)

Eliminate Discrimination: The FCC contended that
customers making few long distance calls did not make
payments that would cover their fixed costs, whereas
customers making a large volume of calls made payments
that were in excess of their costs. Also, the same
facilities were used for different services at
different prices. In some cases, different prices were
charged for essentially the same services. This, to
the FCC, was illegal discrimination.

(3)

Discourage Uneconomic Bypass: Customers may elect to
use ways of making telephone calls other than the
traditional telephone switched network. This is known
as bypass. If prices are based on costs, and a
customer finds and uses a less expensive alternative
(such as constructing its own network), we have
economic bypass. That is what competition is all
about. However, if a service is priced artificially or
arbitrarily high and the customer goes elsewhere, we
have uneconomic bypass. The latter is inefficient, and
the FCC wants to minimize it.

(4)

Preserve Universal Service: A goal of the telephone
industry for decades has been to make basic service
available and affordable to anyone who wants it. The
danger of uneconomic bypass is that the large and most
profitable customers will leave the network. The
remaining smaller customers would then be faced with
large rate increases to make up the contribution of the
departed large users. As rates go higher, more
customers are forced to leave the network. This
snowball effect puts the local companies into what is
described by some as a •death spiral•.

These are noble goals.
some and criticized by many.

The FCC's plan has been praised by
It is scheduled to be reviewed
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later this year.

In the meantime, it is the roadmap that all

must follow in the interstate arena.

The intrastate arena,

however, is the focus of this research.
Status in Virginia
The divestiture and the FCC's access charge plan caused the
Virginia Commission in 1983 to begin an investigation into
providing intrastate of toll service (Case No. PUC830020).
Traditional toll settlement agreements ended on December 31,
1983, and the Commission needed a replacement.

In its Interim

Order of December 23, 1983, the Commission ordered access tariffs
for Virginia LECs which were, with one exception, mirror images
of their FCC tariffs.

They applied for interLATA and intraLATA

access.
For interLATA calls the local company bills the end user
for, and turns the revenues over to the long distance company.
(Some long distance companies bill directly.)

The local comapny

concurrently bills the long distance company access for
originating and/or terminating the call, and keeps the access
revenues.

There is no intrastate pool similar to the interstate

national pool. It is strictly an access "bill and keep"
arrangement using, for the most part, tariffs that are mirror
images of FCC approved interstate tariffs.
In addition, an originating responsibility plan (ORP) was
implemented for intraLATA access.
market is currently prohibited.

Competition in the intraLATA
Therefore, local companies

provide intraLATA toll service on a regulated monopoly basis
similar to local service.

There are no interexchange carriers

(with the exception of incidental calling for which the IXCs
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reimburse the LECs).

Under the ORP, the originating company

bills the customer and keeps the revenue.

If a different company

completes the call, it is paid terminating access charges by the
originating coi:npany.
All access tariffs were ordered on an interim basis.

A

subsequent order on November 30, 1984 allowed revisions, again on
an interim basis.

This order was significant because the

Commission stated on page 2:
However, the Commission is of the opinion that the
•mirroring• of interstate access charges is only a
temporary phenomenon bridging the transition from toll
settlements to cost-based access charges. While each
local exchange carrier may not now have its Virginia
specific costs, Virginia companies, individually or
collectively, should develop costs related to Virginia
expenses and investments rather than relying upon costs
developed natio~g11y for application to interstate
cornrnunications.l )
Nevertheless, mirroring has continued and Virginia specific costs
have not been developed.

Current access tariffs continue to

survive on an interim basis.
Conclusion
In examining the history of settlements, separations, and
access charges, several things are apparent.

This discipline is

complex, arcane, politically charged, evolutionary, and has no
hope of ever reaching an ultimate answer or method upon which all
can agree.

One authority described it this way:
Telephone separations is a process of cost allocations.
It is inherently an arbitrary process in that no
absolute correctness or incorrectness can be attributed
to the premises which underlie its principles. It all
depends on where you wc,.~t to go and what objectives you
are trying to achieve. l )
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As Supreme Court Justice Douglas described it in 1945:
A separation of properties is merely a step in the
determination of costs properly allocable to the
various classes of services rendered by a utility. But
where as here several classes of services have a common
use of the same property, difficulties of separation are
obvi.ous. Allocation of costs is not a matter for the
slide-rule. It involves judgment on a myriad of facts.
It has no claim to exact science.ClO)
The primary goal, therefore, would appear to be to continue
finding interim and arbitrary solutions that best appease the
many interests of the involved parties.
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METHODS OF STUDY

The approach of this study is both theoretical and
practical.

First I will seek a solution from a purely

theoretical accounting, economic, and engineering approach.
I will examine the practical effects of this solution.

Industry

and state specific data is used to aid in the theoretical and
practical examination.
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Next

DISCUSSION
Cost Allocation
As pointed out under the Objectives section, the first
question to answer concerns allocating the fixed costs to the
appropriate jurisdictions and services.

The FCC has already

determined that 25% of the NTS local loop costs will ultimately
be allocated to the interstate jurisdiction.
appropriate?

Is this

How much of the remaining 75% should be allocated

to intrastate toll and how much to local?

Or is it necessary to

allocate the intrastate portion between local and toll?
the toll be allocated between intraLATA and interLATA?

Should
These are

the issues.
Garfield and Lovejoy consider fixed costs to be demand costs
or capacity costs.

They say •in all, at least twenty methods or

formulas have been developed for the allocation of demand costs
to customer classes." C11)
Many of the same cost allocation theories and arguments
similarly apply to cost recovery, that is, who pays and how much
they pay.

This discussion is limited to cost allocation issues,

and will be followed by a separate cost recovery discussion.
I will explore four allocation methodologies:

(1) usage

based, (2) stand alone, (3) value of service, and (4) marginal
cost.
(1)

usage Based Allocation
With this methodology, allocations are based on the relative

amount and type of usage over a particular facility.

Telephone

separations, at least in part, considered usage as a criterion
for many years.

As pointed out earlier, a 1913
20

u.s. Supreme

Court case said that allocations should consider the use made of
the property.

The problem with this method, like most methods,

was it never gave the answer everyone wanted.

Interstate

allocations have been done according to the Ozark plan since
1971.

It embodies the usage concept, but a

applied.

weighting factor is

The resulting answer, called the subscriber plant

factor (SPF} is, on average, about 3.3 times the interstate
subscriber line usage (SLU).

Thus, even though usage is only

around 8 or 9 percent, approximately 28 percent of subscriber
loop costs are allocated to the interstate jurisdiction.

The

trend showing the evolution of actual usage versus allocation is
shown in Figure 1.
Usage has merit because it is quantitative.
explain and understand.

It is easy to

Many products and services today are

priced according to usage.

It has not been workable, however,

since, in many people's opinion,

it does not assign enough costs
Even the FCC recognized this

to the interstate jurisdiction.

when it ordered a 25 percent allocation to interstate.
(2) Stand Alone Allocation
This concept says if it were not possible to share loops,
separate networks would have to be built for local calling and
toll calling.

The total cost of the local network is estimated

and added to the estimated cost of the toll network.

A~locations

are based on the relative ratios of each to the whole.

This

theory was used as early as 1939 in allocating Tennessee Valley
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Figure 1.
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Authority (TVA) dam costs to joint activities such as (1) flood
control, (2) navigation, (3) fertilizer, (4) national defense,
and (5) developing power.

It was called the "alternative cost

avoidance" theory (Glaeser, 1939, p. 267).
There are few, if any, local loop costs that are
specifically for either local or toll calling.

This part of the

network would be built much the same regardless of the service
provided.

Thus, the stand alone cost for each service is roughly

the same.

For example, if we assume the cost to build the local

network is one unit, and the toll network is one unit, the stand
alone allocation for each is 1 f

(1 + 1)

=

50%.

Once the 50

percent allocation to toll is made, the stand alone principle can
be used again to further allocate the toll to the intrastate and
interstate jurisdictions.

Each would end up with 25 percent of

the fixed local loop costs, and local service would get 50
percent.

Ironically, this method allocates the same amount to

the interstate jurisdiction (25%) as the FCC has ordered.
(3)

value of Service Allocation
The value of service principle means a customer pays in

relation to the worth of the service to him or her.
used for many years in pricing local service.

It has been

The rationale

there (local service) says the more people one can call, the more
valuable the service.

For example, basic flat-rate local service

in Pound, Virginia is $9.57.
weighted main
customers).

ter~inals

Pound has less than four thousand

(which are roughly equivalent to

The same service in Alexandria is $16.48, or seventy

two percent higher.

Alexandria customers can call over one

23

million others.

Their service is theoretically more valuable

than that of a Pound customer who can call less than one percent
as many.

Another example of value of service pricing is business

rates being traditionally priced higher than residential service
since a revenue producing business line is ostensibly more
valuable than a residential line.
One problem is this method disregards costs when assigning
rates.

Even though rates are higher, the unit or per customer

plant cost in Alexandria is most likely less than in Pound
because the high customer density allows (1) less cable per
customer and (2) finer gauge (less expensive) cable to be
installed.
Using value of service as a cost allocation methodology
requires determining (1) whether local or toll service is more
valuable, and (2) whether interstate or intrastate toll is more
valuable.

This depends on the calling habits of each customer.

Local service would be much more valuable to a taxi service, and
long distance would be more valuable to a nationwide mail order
catalog business.

Thus, it is extremely hard to quantify the

value of service concept for long distance.

One may assume long

distance service having the potential to call anyone on the
telephone network is more valuable than service to only one
particular customer.

This is not necessarily true, however, if

that person is the only one you call.

Because of these

difficulties, value of service is not a good cost allocation
methodology.
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(4) Marginal Cost Allocation
This methodology gets more attention in the context of cost
recovery (pricing) as opposed to cost allocation.

Not

surprisingly, this paper gives it more coverage there as well.
As an allocation tool, suffice it to say that marginal cost leads
one into an endless circle.

NTS local loop costs are, for all

practical purposes, fixed (at least in the short run).

(Some

authorities make rather convincing arguments that local loop
costs are not fixed and are not non-traffic sensitive.
discussion, see Wilson, 1983.)

For a

Therefore, the short run marginal

cost of making a long distance call (either interstate or
intrastate) is zero.

This implies the allocation to long

distance should be zero.

However, the marginal cost of making a

local call is also zero, which says no costs should be allocated
to local.

If no cost is allocated to local and none to long

distance, where does one allocate?

Marginal cost, then, is not

helpful except under the erroneous assumption that the network
was built for local service and all NTS costs should be allocated
to local since the marginal cost of toll is zero.

(The same

rationale could as easily prove all costs should be allocated to
toll.)
Cost Allocation Conclusions
From the discussion, it is clear that the two methodologies
with the most merit are the usage based and the stand alone.
These are both quantifiable and logical.

The value of service

approach is entirely too subjective since it is impossible to

ge~'

a consensus of all users and all classes of service regarding the
relative value of each.

Marginal cost (at least in the short
25

run) begs the chicken/egg question of which comes first -- local
service or toll service.
consensus on that.

It is also impossible to get a

The two remaining approaches compare

interestingly·as shown in Table 2:
Table 2
Comparison of usage Based and
Stand Alone Allocation Methodologies
(Percentages of total NTS local loop costs to be allocated
to each category)
Jurisdiction
Local

usage Based(a)

Stand Alone

83.4%

50.0%

2.9%
3.6%
6.5%

12.5%
12.5%
25.0%

10.1%

25.0%

16.6%

50.0%

Toll:
Intrastate:
IntraLATA
InterLATA
Total Intrastate
Interstate
Total To1·1

(a)Based on the combined minutes of use of the 5 largest
Local Exchange Companies in Virginia: Chesapeake & Potomac,
Centel, Continental, United Inter-Mountain, and General of the
South. Since these companies serve 97% of the customers in
Virginia, this is assumed to be representative of a statewide
average. (Underlying minutes of use data was accumulated by
Larry J. Cody of the Virginia SCC staff.)
These two methodologies give a range of allocation
percentages which could easily be justified.
alone for several reasons:

I favor the stand

(1) it is rational (2) it is easy to

calculate (3) it is inexpensive to calculate (4) it doesn't
change and (5) it is fair.

Further, perhaps by coincidence and
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perhaps not, the FCC has already determined the allocation to
interstate is 25% which is consistent with the stand alone
theory.
At this point it is not necessary to allocate the remaining
75% to the various intrastate classes.
for ratemaking purposes.

They are treated as one

However, increased toll competition is

evident, and intraLATA toll may be deregulated in the future (it
is still regulated but faces competition from resellers).

Also,

there is increased pressure to price services closer to costs.
All these factors point towards a necessity to further allocate
intrastate costs between local, intraLATA toll, and interLATA
toll.

For example, if intraLATA competition is allowed (it is

currently being investigated by the Virginia Commission in Docket
PUC850036), it will be necessary for local companies to charge
themselves access charges to originate and terminate intraLATA
toll calls.

They will be competing with the same long distance

companies that are now their customers, and thus should charge
themselves the same access charges they charge the long distance
companies.

The stand alone methodology is a reasonable way to

further allocate NTS local loop costs to the interstate service
classes.
Cost Recovery
Now that costs have been allocated, we must decide how they
will be paid or recovered.

Simply put, who should pay, how much

should they pay, and how wi 11 they pay?
pay, there are two issues:

To answer who should

(1) which classes of service should

pay (e.g., toll or local), and (2) which customers within each
class of service should pay (e.g., end users or long distance
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companies)?

After identifying who should pay, it is important to

decide how much each should pay.

Once this is determined, we

must consider the method of payment, that is, whether it should
be a flat rate, based on usage, or other.
In considering who will pay we first must decide over which
classes of service or nproductsn the recovery (revenue
requirements) will be spread.

There are four:

(1) local

service, (2) intraLATA toll service, (3) interLATA (intrastate)
toll service, and (4) interstate toll service.

As a point of

clarification, costs were allocated to njurisdictionsn (i.e.,
interstate versus intrastate), but now the revenue requirements
will be spread over, and recovered from, generic classes or types
of service (i.e., interstate toll versus intrastate toll) which,
not unexpectedly, parallel the jurisdictions.

Another .Point of

clarification, for simplicity I will refer to intrastate
intraLATA service as •intraLATA•, intrastate interLATA as
ninterLATAn and interstate as •interstate".
The second step in deciding who will pay is identifying the
customers within each generic class of service.
service, there are local customers.

For local

Of course this could be

further segregated into residential and business, but for sake of
simplicity, we will consider local customers as one.
type of customer is the intraLATA toll customer.

The second

The third is

interLATA toll and the fourth is the interstate toll customer.
These are all end users.

(We could say there are only local and

toll customers, but further segregating toll is consistent ,with
the way we allocated costs.

Also, long distance rates may vary
{

"'·-
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and in fact are different for most companies in Virginia for
intraLATA, interLATA, and interstate toll.)
For the interLATA and interstate toll classes of service
there is one other customer of special significance, that being
the long distance companies.

They are customers of the local

exchange companies, and the service they receive is called
access, that is, access to the end user customers who originate
and terminate toll calls.

Since they receive a service furnished

over the jointly used local loop, the long distance companies are
also candidates to pay for the local loop.
Of course, long distance companies have the option to build
their networks directly to end users.

In some cases they already

have, especially for high usage customers.

This is called "local

exchange" bypass (opposed to "carrier" bypass when the customer
builds its own private network and avoids both the local and the
long distance carrier).

It is impractical, however, for long

distance companies to extend networks to reach all customers.
They would have to duplicate that which the local companies
already have in place.

Thus, it is more economical and more

logical for them to reach their customers through local
companies' networks.

The local companies offer this service to

the long distance companies and charge •access" for it.
Long distance companies argue the "access" should work in
the opposite direction.

That is, the local companies should

offer "access" service to end users so they can interconnect with
the long distance companies.

The end user customers, they say,

should pay •access" to the local companies instead of the long
distance companies paying it.

In the end, of course, the same
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customer is going to pay.

Either the end user pays the local

company direct for access, or the end user pays the long distance
company indirectly for access.

In the latter case, the access

charges (paid -to the local company by the long distance company)
are an expense of doing business and are built into long distance
rates.
The point of all this is to identify five candidates to pay
for local loop non-traffic sensitive costs:

(1) local service

customers, (2) intraLATA toll customers, (3) interLATA toll
customers, (4) interstate toll customers, and (5) long distance
companies.

All are receiving a service and something of economic

value, so all should pay.
How much should each pay?

As pointed out ear 1 ier, the FCC

demonstrated that it really doesn't matter how much cost is
allocated to the interstate jurisdiction if it is all paid by end
users and none by interexchange carriers.

Taking it to the

extreme, you could theoretically allocate all NTS local loop
costs to the interstate jurisdiction and recover all through flat
monthly charges to end users.

Therefore, the answer to this

question is critical.
It is a classic rate design question.

We know the revenue

requirement (which equals costs determined from the cost
allocation process plus a fair return) and we know who should
pay.

Now we must decide how much of the revenue requirement'~ach

customer (or class of service) must pay.

In doing this, I wilY'

discuss six cost recovery or rate design theories:

(1) usage

based (2) value of service (3) stand alone (4) revenue based (5)
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market based and (6) marginal cost.
look very familiar.

The first three and the last

They are the same as the cost allocation

methodologies previously examined.

Thus, it is possible to

apportion revenue requirements using the same theory used for
allocating costs.
(1) usage Based Recovery
The basic premise here is the same as in the usage based
allocation discussion.

That is, those using a service should

pay for it in proportion to how much they use it.

If for

example, 10% of total usage is interstate toll (See Table 3),
then 10% of NTS local loop revenue requirements should be
recovered through interstate toll.
Table 3
Osage Based Recovery
by Class of Service
Class of Service

Recovery based on Usage
(%of Total Revenue Requirements)(a)

Local

83.4%

Toll:
Intrastate:
IntraLATA
InterLATA
Total Intrastate

2.9%
3.6%
6.5%

10.1%

Interstate

16.6%

Total Toll

(a>see Table 2 for reference to the source of these percentages.
Unfortunately, for two classes of service (interLATA toll and
interstate toll), this does not answer the question of which
customer within the class should pay (end users or long distance
companies).

This will be discussed later.
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(2) value of Service Recovery
Similar to value of service cost allocations, this says the
more valuable the service, the more recovery should come from
that service.

Ergo, business rates historically have been

roughly double residential rates.

As I will discuss later in

marginal cost recovery, economists say this is inefficient since
it artif ically supresses business calling and stimulates
residential calling.

It may be possible to get away with value

of service pricing in a regulated world where there is no
competition.

Introduce competition and one will quickly see

bypass if the rate is too high.

Also, it is very subjective to

quantify the precise value using this method.
more value than interstate toll?

Is local service

For some it may be and for

others it may not.
(3) Stand Alone Recovery
The same theory applies here as it did in stand alone
allocation.

Thus, access charges to interexchange carriers

would be priced to recover 25% of the total revenue requirements
from interstate toll and 12.5% from interLATA toll.

The

remaining 62.5% would be recovered through local rates (50%) and
intraLATA toll rates (12.5%) (see Table 4).
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Table 4
Stand Alone Recovery
by Class of Service
Class of Service

Stand Alone Recovery
(% of Total Revenue Requirements)

Local

50.0%

Toll:
Intrastate:
IntraLATA
InterLATA
Total Intrastate

12.5%
12.5%
25.0%

Interstate

25.0%

Total Toll

50.0%

Again, as in usage based recovery, this method does not say
whether interLATA toll and interstate toll recovery should come
from end users or long distance companies.
(4) Revenue Based Recovery
This recovery principle says future recovery should come
from the same customers in the same proportions as in the past.
It gives no weight to whether past methodologies were correct or
whether changing conditions exist.

It has merit, nonetheless,

when a transition is necessary to move from one plan to another
radically different one to avoid abrupt changes that could force
customer dislocations.
(5) Market Based Recovery
The idea here is to see what the competitive market will
bear, as long as prices are above costs.

Competitiors in this

market are the end user customers, the IXC customers, and the
LECs.

The competing service is bypass.

from certain customers, they will bypass.
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If recovery is excessive
For example, if

· ·~

excessive recovery comes from end users, they may build their own
private networks to bypass the LECs.

That is a signal to

regulators and companies to reduce prices.

The goal is to seek a

market determined price that is above costs and low enough to
prevent uneconomic bypass.

The inherent danger is it may take

bypass to prove rates are too high.

Once bypass occurs, it is

unlikely the customers will return, especially where the customer
(either interexchange carriers or end users) builds its own
network.
(6) Marginal Cost Recovery
This theory is important since it considers which customer
within a class of service should pay.

I will use this in

attempting to answer whether end users or long distance companies
should pay for local loop NTS recovery in the interLATA and
interstate toll classes of service.
According to Kahn, (1970, p. 65 & 66), if economic theory is
to have any relevance to public utility pricing, equating price
and marginal cost must be the starting point.

He says:

••• marginal cost is the cost of producing one more
unit; it can equally be envisaged as the cost that
would be saved by producing one less unit. Looked at
the first way, it may be termed incremental cost ••••
Observed in the secon~ way, it is synonymous with
avoidable costs •••• Cl )
Economists argue that efficient competitive pricing would
have prices equal short-run marginal costs.

The problem is first

identifying marginal costs, and second segregating short-run from
long-run marginal costs.

Kahn (1970, p. 71) says

causal responsibility is the key to defining marginal costs.
That is, the person who causes an additional unit of a commodity
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to be produced and purchased should have to pay for the
incremental cost of that unit.

Conversely, the incremental cost

of that unit is the marginal cost.

At the surface, it appears

easy to segregate short-run costs from long-run costs.

For

example, a short-run cost would include the material and
production costs to manufacture one more unit of a product.

The

cost to expand or replace the production facility would not be a
short-run cost unless that unit couldn't be produced without
expansion or replacement.

Any fixed costs would not be

considered short-run marginal costs.

In the long run, however,

all costs are variable and thus marginal.

A deeper look reveals

several problems, especially in telephone utility pricing.
depreciation a short-run marginal cost?

Is

Since it is typically

the second highest operating expense (next to maintenance), it
would be suicidal to ignore depreciation in telephone pricing.
However, no accountant or engineer would agree that depreciation
is a short-run marginal cost.

It is a fixed cost.

So it seems

dangerous to argue prices should equal short-run marginal costs
thereby ignoring the second highest operating expense.

Kahn gets

around this (1970 p. 72) by arguing depreciation is a variable
cost since wear and tear on equipment varies with use.

Service

lives of today's technology equipment are largely a function of
economic life due to obsolescence and not wear and tear, however.
I point this out to illustrate the economic principle of setting
price equal to marginal cost is somewhat ambiguous in telephone
pricing.
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Non-traffic sensitive local loop plant is (arguably) a
fixed, as opposed to variable, cost in the short run.

Therefore,

its short-run marginal cost is zero, and this theory says there
should be no charge to interexchange long distance companies for
using this plant to originate and terminate calls.

As Kahn

points out, "Access costs are incurred when the subscriber
subscribes -- not to interstate service, not to intrastate
service, not to local service, but to the availability of any and
al 1 of these." Cl 4 )

He says (1982, p. 4) the Smith I 11 inoi s Bel 1

Supreme Court decision arrived at an economically false
proposition that interstate usage should bear some of the nontraffic sensitive costs.

Thus, he agrees (and applauds) the FCC

philosophy and goal that these costs should not be assessed
against long distance companies but should be levied directly on
subscribers in a lump sum monthly charge for the availability of
local, intrastate toll, and interstate toll.
Kahn (1982) makes a very appealing argument in favor of
using marginal cost pricing for telephone service.

He says local

rates have been subsidized by toll for many years because toll
rates are priced to include recovery of NTS costs.

Further, it

is wrong to recover costs that do not vary with usage (local loop
costs) in usage charges (toll rates).

He says (this was in 1982

so the prices are dated but the point is still applicable):
••• people seem to believe that if something is
regulated it can defy the principles of economics: the
same people who may be paying $15 - $25 per month for
cable TV, Home Box Office, and the like seem to regard
a $6 - $10 rat~ for unlimited local calling as a Godgiven right. <15 >
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He also calls for deaveraging and unbundling:
There's no reason why the people being served in
existing service areas by existing drop lines, should
be subsidizing the people who are causing the system to
incur new, higher costs of access to the network.Cl6)
••• by putting the burden of access charging on the
operating companies, on the basis of their own,
individual costs, the (Consent) Decree clearly
encourages de-averaging ••• whi~h is also the direction
economic efficiency dictates. (17)
Thus, the marginal cost pricing theory would have the long
distance companies pay none of the NTS local loop cost, and the
end users pay all.
the tab.

The person with "causal responsibility" gets

In theory it sounds good, but it overlooks several

critical points.

First, telephone service, unlike electric, gas

and other utilities, is two-way.

Its value lies both in being

able to make as well as receive calls.

In fact, more value is

probably placed in making calls which sharply contrasts with
other utility services where you only receive electricity, etc.
Telephone pricing has traditionally been designed by averaging
and bundling to make the service affordable to all.

The more

people to call and receive calls from, the better and more
valuable the service.

If one customer's marginal cost is very

small, it doesn't accomplish anything to deaverage and unbundle
to make that customer's service cheap if others' service becomes
prohibitively expensive.

If others drop off the network and the

first customer has no one to call, the value of his service is
not much.
theory.

This gets back to the "value of service" pricing
Of course there are exceptions where a customer may wish

to make and receive calls from only one other customer or a
limited number of customers.

A typical example would be the
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internal. calling needs of a business with several locations.
However, the vast majority of customers, I believe, desire to
have the capability to make and receive calls from virtually
everyone.

Strict marginal cost pricing would not allow this.

Second, marginal cost pricing would permit the economic
falacy of allowing someone to get something of value and pay
nothing for it.

There certainly is value for a long distance

company in being able to have its calls originated and terminated
without having to extend its network to interconnect directly
with end users.
For these reasons, I conclude the marginal cost economic
premise that end users should pay all NTS local loop costs and
long distance companies should pay none is flawed.

The long

distance companies should pay some if not all NTS local loop
costs allocated to the interLATA and interstate jurisdictions.

A

close analogy to this situation is a shopping mall or an airport.
Both of these have common areas such as enclosed walkways,
lounges, restrooms, etc. that are largely fixed costs.

These

areas are used jointly by customers going to the stores in the
mall or by airline passengers.

The marginal cost of that

customer or passenger using the common area is zero (except for
minor cleaning and maintenance).

Therefore, the store customers

and passengers are not charged a flat fee to enter the mall or
airport.

These fixed costs are recovered through the rent

charged to the stores and airlines, and are passed on to
customers in the cost of merchandise and plane fares.

The

jointly used area can be thought of as the local loop, and the
stores and airlines are the long distance companies.
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It is

illogical to expect customers to buy tickets to enter a mall or
airport.

This would deter usage.

It is equally illogical to

expect telephone customers to pay local loop recovery in the form
of a segregated flat rate charge.

Instead the local companies

should charge rent to the long distance companies.

In turn, this

would be built into prices of the LEC's merchandise -- toll
calls.
The next question asks how the payment should be made.

The

most obvious forms are through fixed rates, uniform usage rates
declining block or variable usage rates, or a combination of all.
The underlying economic principle here, I believe, is to develop
a rate schedule that has an incentive to promote usage and
efficiency.

The flat rate does this best.

Present local service

usage of over 80% (which for the most part is based on flat
rates) is a prime example.

(In fact, some argue this service has

been over-promoted to the point of being economically
inefficient.)

The uniform usage rate is less desirable.

If more

calling means paying more at the same rate (for example, at 4.5
cents per minute), the less incentive there is to call.

The

declining block variable usage rate encourages more calling or at
least rewards more calling by giving lower rates or volume
discounts for high usage.

Therefore, the preferred pricing

scheme would be to use flat rates, variable usage rates, or a
combination of the two.

Since NTS local loop costs are fixed

costs in the short run, it seems logical to recover these costs
through fixed or flat rate charges.
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Cost Recovery Conclusions
The original questions were:

(1) Who should pay,

much should each pay, and (3) How will they pay?

(2) How

From the

foregoing discussion, we can conclude that (1) recovery for NTS
local loop costs should come from local service, intraLATA toll
service, interLATA toll service, and interstate toll service.
The end user customers of the first two service classes should
pay.

For the last two, long distance companies should pay some,

if not all, of the costs allocated to those jurisdictions.

The

amount of the payment depends on the revenue requirements
assigned to each class of service.

The two most logical

assignment methods are (1) usage based and (2) stand alone.
I

~

form of payment should be flat rate.
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RESULTS OF STUDY

With this theoretical and sometimes opinionated discussion
behind us, I will now present a practical evaluation of the
various allocation ·and recovery alternatives using empirical
data.

These results are designed to give zone-of-reasonableness

answers and are not intended to be exact.
estimates at best.

They are rough

Many assumptions were made, but the results

give an accurate portrayal of the issues (with the potential risk
of being over simplified).
Remember the present allocation and recovery guidelines:
o

Allocation of NTS local loop costs is frozen at 1983
Subscriber Plant Factor (SPF) levels. This averages
28% nationwide.

o

The interstate allocation will move (up or down)
towards 25% for each company over 8 years.

o

Current interstate recovery comes in part from a
carrier common line usage charge of 4.33 cents per
minute of use paid by the long distance companies to
the local companies.

o

The rest of the interstate recovery comes from a
flat monthly subscriber line charge paid by end users.
It equals $1 for residential and single line business,
a maximum of $6.00 for multi-line business, and $2.00
for Centrex.

First I will look at this issue from a national perspective.
The estimated 1985 NTS local loop revenue requirement is $35.6
Bil 1 ion per year.

(Goldberg, 1986, p. 1)

This equals

approximately $310 per line or $25.80 per line per month.
(1) of Table s shows how this is presently recovered.

Column

Column (2)

shows the recovery assuming costs are allocated and recovered
based on usage.

Column (3) assumes allocation and recovery based

on stand alone costs.

Column (4) assumes 25% of the costs
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wi~l

be allocated to the interstate jurisdiction (as the stand alone
theory would do and the FCC will do over 8 years).
long distance companies is based on usage.

Recovery from

For interstate, the

difference between the 25% cost allocation ($8.9B) and the usage
recovery ($3.6B) is recovered through the SLC ($5.3B).

For the

75% intrastate allocation ($26.7B), long distance companies pay
the usage based CCLC ($1.3B) and the residual ($25.4B) is
recovered from local and intraLATA toll.
Table 5
Nationwide HTS Local Loop Recovery Analysis
($ Billions)
(1)

Recovery
Source
End Users:
Intrastate
Local, Toll,(d) & SLC(e)
Interstate
SLC
End User Subtotal
Long Distance Companies:
Intrastate
InterLATA Toll (CCLC)
Interstate
Interstate Toll (CCLC)
Long Distance Company Subtotal
Grand Total
Intrastate Subtotal
Interstate Subtotal
Grand Total

(2)

(3)

21.0

30.7

22.3

25.4

2.4
24.2

30.7

0

22.3

5.3
30.7

3.1

1.3

4.4

1.3

8.3
11.4
35.6

4:9

3.6

35.6

8.9
13.3
35.6

4:9

24.9
10.7
35.6

32.0
3.6
35.6

26.7
8.9
35.6

26.7
8.9
35.6

0

(a)Present Recovery data is from J. J. Goldberg's "Recovery of
Interstate NTS Revenue Requirements: Current and Projected
Results"
(b)Based on percentages in Table 3.
(c)Based on percentages in Table 4.
(d)IntraLATA Toll
(e)Most states, including Virginia, do not have an intrastate
SLC.

L__

(4)

Usage Baf
Present<a>usage<b>stana<c>with 25~
Recovery Based
Alone
Allocate

3.6

35.6

As 'shown in Table 6, moving from the present condition to a
Usage Based plan (Column 2) would shift $6.5B to end users
(about $4.70 per line per month), which is not an unbearable
amount.

It would also shift $7.lB from the interstate to the

intrastate jurisdiction.

In doing so, revenue requirements to

long distance companies would reduce $6.5B or 57%.

Using the

current interstate CCLC of 4.33 cents per minute as a base, this
rate would fall to 1.86 cents.

[(l - .57) x 4.33)

Moving from Column (1) to a Stand Alone plan (Column 3)
would decrease end user revenue requirements by $1.9B.

However,

$1.SB would shift to the intrastate jurisdiction, and long
distance company revenue requirements would increase $1.9B.

The

CCLC would increase to 5.05 cents. This could be a problem if
long distance companies are correct in saying existing CCLC rates
are inducing uneconomic bypass.
A shift from existing to a usage Based Recovery with a 25%
interstate allocator (Column 4) would increase end user revenue
requirements the same as moving to Column 2 ($6.5B or $4.70 per
line per month).
interstate SLC.

However, $2.9B of the $6.SB will come from the
Thus, intrastate local rates will only have to

absorb $3.6B or $2.60 per line per month.

The long distance

companies get the same $6.SB reduction (1.98 cents CCLC) and only
$1.SB additional revenue requirements shift to intrastate.
advantages of this plan are very appealing.
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Table 6
Nationwide NTS Local Loop Recovery Analysis
Changes from Present Recovery
($ Billions)

Recovery
source
End Users:
Intrastate
Local, Toll & SLC
Interstate
SLC
End User Subtotal

(1)

(2)

(3)

Present
Recover:t

usage
Based

Stand
Alone

(4)
usage Bai
With 25~
Allocate

8.9

o.s

3.6

{2. 4)
6.5

{2. 4)
(1.9)

6:5

{1. 8)

1.3

(1.8)

0

0
()

Long Distance Companies:
Intrastate
InterLATA Toll {CCLC)
Interstate
Interstate Toll (CCLC)
Long Distance Company Subtotal
Grand Total
Intrastate Subtotal
Interstate Subtotal
Grand Total
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0

2.9

0
()
0

(4.7)

0.6

(4.7)

(6.5)

1.9

{6. 5)

0
0
0

7.1
(7.1)

0

0

01.8
(1.8)
0

0

1.8
(1.8~

0

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

There are two cost allocation and cost recovery techniques
that have merit.
alone.

They are the (1) usage based and (2) stand

A comparison follows:
usage Based

Stand Alone

o

Allocates more costs to intrastate than stand alone and more
than existing

o

Allocates less costs to
intrastate than usage based
and more than existing

o

Recovers more from End users
than stand alone and more than
existing

o

Recovers less from end users
than usage based and less
than existing

o

Recovers less from long
distance companies

o

Recovers more from long
distance companies

o

Has no End User SLC

o

Has no End user SLC

o

Recovers all interstate costs
from long distance companies

o

Recovers all interstate costs
from long distance companies

o

Interstate recovery would
be less than existing

o

Interstate recovery would
be less than existing

o

Intrastate InterLATA recovery
would be less than stand
alone and less than existing

o

Intrastate InterLATA recovery
would be more than usage
based and more than existing

Using a usage based allocation and recovery method would
appear to be the most objective and logical approach.

However,

this perhaps unnecessarily shifts significant revenue
requirements to the intrastate jurisdiction and the end users.
On the other hand, a stand alone allocation and recovery plan
would require increased recovery from long distance companies,
most likely through higher carrier common line charges.

This

approach is at odds with the current trend to reduce these
charges.

I suggest it is appropriate to adopt a range of

45

recovery· with usage as one extreme and stand alone as the other.
The optimum level within the range would be determined by
competitive market conditions.
Unfortunately, however, a range with this variance is not
all that helpful for the near term problem at hand.

Therefore, I

suggest a more narrow range that would be bounded by existing
recovery on the upper end and usage based recovery with a 25%
interstate allocation at the lower end.

Again, optimal rates

would be determined by market conditions (as discussed on pages
31 and 32) within this range.

There are several advantages.

First, this would require minimal changes to existing procedures.
Part 67 of the FCC rules (cost allocations) would not have to be
altered.

Only Part 69 (cost recovery) would require change.

Second, present recovery from long distance companies would be
frozen.

Therefore, if there truly is a bypass problem (and this

has not yet been proven conclusively), it would not be made
worse.

Third, the usage based recovery with a 25% interstate

allocation is extremely attractive as it is a hybrid of the stand
alone allocation method and the usage based recovery method.

It

combines the advantages of both by having the long distance
companies pay their fair share determined by usage without
shifting additional revenue requirements to the intrastate
jurisdiction.

The disadvantage is it shifts additional revenue

requirements to end users in the form of higher Subscriber Line
Charges (slightly more than double present recovery) and it
increases revenue requirements for local and intraLATA toll by
roughly 16%.

However, this is a worst case scenario.

It is

entirely possible that market conditions would support higher
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recovery from long distance companies without significant bypass.
Bypass could be easily monitored by looking at the usage trends
from year to year.

If total minutes of use increase at a stable

rate, it is unlikely bypass is a problem.

However, if minutes of

use decline, bypass is a likely cause.
A variation of this proposal would be to treat originating
and terminating minutes of use differently.

Since bypass most

easily and frequently occurs on the originating end, the
originating CCLC rate could be reduced towards the lower end of
the range (usage based).

Since most customers wish to have the

capability to call •the world•, it is much more difficult to
bypass on the terminating end of the call.

Accordingly, the

terminating CCLC rate could be kept at present levels.

The FCC

in fact recently issued guidelines that freeze the terminating
CCLC at the present 4.33 cents per minute rate, and allow the
originating rate to decline.
Concerning the form of recovery, I believe local companies
should be given pricing flexibility that would stimulate usage.
The preferred choice would be for the local companies to charge a
flat rate •rent• to the long distance companies for use of the
local loop.

This rent could be renegotiated yearly or even

monthly if conditions warrant.

It could be calculated using the

previously discussed parameters.

That is, it would be market

driven within a predetermined range.

The second choice would be

to continue a usage based recovery rate but institute volume
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discounts or tapered rates to induce usage (preferably in off
peak periods).

The least preferred option is to continue the

uniform CCLC.
In conclusion I emphasize there is not a single correct
answer in the·world of separations and access charges.
field is in a state of permanent change.

This

I trust in this paper I

have given insight to the history of the problem, the theory of
current issues, as well as offering a workable plan for the
future.
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